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Abstract. Proving the unconditional security of a quantum key distribution (QKD)
scheme is a highly challenging task as one needs to determine the most efficient
attack compatible with experimental data. This task is even more demanding for
continuous-variable QKD as the Hilbert space where the protocol is described is infinite
dimensional. A very natural way to address this problem is to make an extensive use
of the symmetries of the protocols. In this article, we investigate a symmetry in phase
space that is particularly relevant to continuous-variable QKD, and explore the way
towards a new quantum de Finetti theorem that would exploit this symmetry and
provide a powerful tool to assess the security of continuous-variable protocols.
Security of continuous-variable QKD: exploiting symmetries in phase space 2
1. Introduction and motivation
The greatest novelty brought by Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is that, for the
first time, a secret key agreement scheme can be proven unconditionally secure, that is,
without making any assumptions about the power of an adversary.
Even if this claim has been made repeatedly since the proposal of the first
QKD protocol in 1984 [1], it is only recently that complete proofs of security have
been rigourously established. Proving the security of a scheme without making any
simplifying assumptions is indeed quite challenging: the legitimate parties, Alice and
Bob, need to infer what is the most efficient attack that an eavesdropper, Eve, could
perform. This can be achieved by considering all bipartite states ρAB compatible with
Alice and Bob’s data, but this quickly becomes almost untractable since the dimension of
the Hilbert spaceH⊗n relevant to describe ρAB grows exponentially with the number n of
quantum signals exchanged during the protocol. As a consequence, security proofs were
often derived while restricting the adversary to the so-called collective attacks. In such
attacks, the state ρAB is supposed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.),
meaning that there exists a state σAB ∈ H such that ρAB = σ⊗nAB. As a consequence,
the Hilbert space needed to analyze the protocol becomes H instead of H⊗n: no need
to emphasize that this “small” assumption considerably simplifies the analysis !
The question then is to know whether such a hypothesis limits the power of the
adversary in a non trivial way, or, said otherwise, whether this leads to an unreasonably
optimistic view of the security of QKD. Fortunately, this is not the case as collective
attacks were recently proven asymptotically optimal against protocols described with a
finite-dimensional Hilbert space [2]. The main tool used to answer this problem was a
quantum de Finetti theorem which can be roughly summarized as saying that a certain
class of states in H⊗n, namely symmetric states, can be well approximated by mixtures
of i.i.d. states. From a cryptographic point of view, this means that general symmetric
attacks are almost the same as collective attacks. The last step to complete the proof is
to show that a symmetric attack is optimal for the eavesdropper, or, equivalently, that
the state ρAB can safely be assumed symmetric, which is indeed the case for most QKD
protocols.
The quantum de Finetti theorem is thus quite powerful as it allows to derive the
security of a QKD scheme against arbitrary attacks as soon as its security against
collective attacks is proven. Moreover, the full security is obtained almost for free, in
the sense that the decrease of key size caused by allowing the adversary to perform
any non-collective attack is negligible, at least in an asymptotic regime. In a finite size
scenario, however, the impact on the key size could be significant, although it should
be compared with other finite-size effects such as the precision of parameter estimation
or the efficiency of error correction [3]. In this context, alternatives to the de Finetti
theorem might also be worth investigating as they can lead to improved bounds [4].
Unfortunately, the application of the quantum de Finetti theorem that was
presented in [2] is restricted to QKD schemes that are described in a finite-dimensional
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Hilbert space. Apart from the fact that decribing any protocol in a finite-dimensional
Hilbert space is nothing less than an approximation (even though quite a reasonable one
for protocols involving qubits), it is clear that it does not apply to protocols genuinely
described in infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces such as protocols explicitly built on the
continuous amplitude components of the light field (see [5] and references therein). The
reason for this is that the quantum de Finetti theorem fails as soon as the dimension d
of the Hilbert space H is not small compared to the number n of subsystems considered,
which is obviously the case if d is infinite. Moreover, not only is the present version of
the quantum de Finetti theorem limited to low dimensional Hilbert spaces, but counter-
examples have been exhibited that demonstrate that a dimension-independent de Finetti
theorem cannot exist [6].
Nevertheless, the impossiblity of a general dimension-independent theorem does
not rule out the possibility of more restricted versions of the theorem, which might still
be highly relevant to prove the security of QKD schemes. In particular, the quantum de
Finetti theorem of [2] is concerned with (permutation) symmetric states in H⊗n, that is,
states that are invariant under arbitrary permutations of their n subsystems. The only
approach that has been pursued to date in order to extend the range of application of
this theorem to infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces has consisted in restricting the set
of states in such a way that a finite-dimension theorem can be applied [7, 8, 9, 11]. In
particular, in [9], the quantum de Finetti theorem of [2] has been applied to infinite-
dimensional quantum systems conditioned on certain measurement results. The main
consequence is to rigorously justify the assumption of a finite-dimension theorem in the
context of QKD protocols using attenuated coherent pulses as the support for qubits.
The theorem can then be used to derive the security of some continuous-variable schemes
[10] as long as the energy of the signal states is not too important. The main drawback
is that some experimental conditions need to be checked, which was not the case for
finite-dimensional protocols.
In this paper, we explore a radically different approach, which might greatly simplify
the security proofs of continuous-variable QKD. The idea is to derive a new quantum
de Finetti theorem corresponding to symmetry classes other than permutations of the
subsystems. Our main insight is to describe the protocol in phase space instead of Fock
representation, and to study a symmetry group that is specific to phase space. This
choice features several advantages. First, the phase space representation is the natural
choice for the analysis of continuous-variable QKD where the information is typically
encoded onto the quadratures of the light field (see [5]). Moreover, if collective attacks
are indeed asymptotically optimal as they generally are for discrete-variable QKD, it
would be nice to have an interpretation of this result using covariance matrices. It should
be pointed out that when restricted to collective attacks, the security of the protocol
is completely characterized by the covariance matrix of the system shared by Alice and
Bob [12, 13]. Last but not least, the phase space representation has the remarkable
property to be finite dimensional: one just traded a discrete description in a infinite-
dimensional Hilbert space (the Fock representation) for a continuous description in a
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finite-dimensional real space.
Interestingly, in a classical setting, versions of the de Finetti theorem that apply
to orthogonally-invariant continuous probability distributions have been known since a
long time. Here, we make the first steps towards the generalization of this theorem
to a quantum setting. Obviously, since a general dimension-independent quantum de
Finetti theorem is impossible, we cannot hope to establish one just by switching between
an infinite-dimensional state-space representation and a finite-dimensional phase-space
representation. The trick is that the symmetry hypotheses needed for the phase-space
de Finetti theorem are stronger than the ones used in the previous quantum versions
of the de Finetti theorem. We will show that these stronger symmetry hypotheses are,
however, perfectly compatible with continuous-variable QKD protocols.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we explicitely make the link
between symmetry properties and security proofs. In Section 3, we present continuous-
variable QKD and introduce a new symmetry for such protocols. This symmetry is then
presented in more details in Section 4, where we make the preliminary steps towards
the derivation of a new quantum de Finetti theorem for continuous variables. Finally,
the conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Role of symmetry in the security proofs
The goal of this Section is to explain how symmetry considerations can simplify the
theoretical analysis of quantum cryptography. In particular, we would like to provide a
theoretical justification to the common attitude of considering the state ρAB shared by
Alice and Bob as being symmetric. Note that a more mathematical argument can be
found in [4].
As we mentioned previously, applying a de Finetti theorem to prove the security
of QKD protocols works if one can first assume, without loss of generality, that the
state ρAB is symmetric, that is invariant under any permutation of its n subsystems.
Here, we show that this assumption is justified, but that one is actually not limited
to considering the action of this particular symmetry group Sn (one can also consider
larger symmetry groups). Basically, the idea is that by assuming any symmetry, Alice
and Bob will always underestimate the secret key rate they can extract from their data.
The secret key rate for a particular instance of a QKD protocol is a function of
the state ρAB shared by the legitimate parties, Alice and Bob. The eavesdropper, Eve,
is assumed to have the maximal information compatible with ρAB meaning that her
state ρE is such that ρE = trAB(|ΨABE〉) where |ΨABE〉 is any purification of ρAB.
Note that all purifications are equivalent up to a unitary operation applied on system
E. More precisely, ρAB represents the knowledge that Alice and Bob have about the
quantum state they share. For this reason, ρAB is subjective and inevitably depends
on assumptions made by Alice and Bob. It must be emphasized that this cannot be
avoided by performing a quantum tomography of the state since the latter is also subject
to hypotheses, namely that one has access to an arbitrary large number of independent
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and identical copies of a single state. The exponential version of the quantum de Finetti
theorem as derived in [2] gives a partial answer to this problem: if ρAB is invariant under
permutations of its subsystems, then it can be well approximated by a mixture of i.i.d.
states, so quantum tomography is therefore justified.
A crucial observation is that Alice and Bob would like to ignore or forget the
properties of ρAB they are not interested in, typically possible correlations between
the n subsystems of their state, hence obtaining ρAB = σ
⊗n
AB for some prototype state
σAB ∈ H. Unfortunately, this action of forgetting comes at a price, namely erasing some
potentially useful information. The first idea to make the argument more rigourous is
that Alice and Bob can actually enforce the symmetry they want. Let us for instance
consider symmetry under permutations of the subsystems of ρAB which is the symmetry
commonly used in various QKD security proofs (with the notable exception of protocols
such as the Differential Phase Shift (DPS) [14] or the Coherent One-Way (COW) [15]).
This symmetry can be enforced in the following way: Alice and Bob can perform the
same random permutation pi over their respective state, with pi being chosen uniformly
over the symmetric group Sn. This operation transforms ρAB into
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
piρABpi
† ⊗ |pi〉〈pi|C
where pi is the unitary operator implementing the permutation pi to both systems A and
B, {|pi〉}pi is an orthogonal family of vectors and C is a classical auxiliary space whose
sole purpose is to store the information concerning the permutation pi that was applied.
Then, tracing over system C (or equivalently giving this system to Eve), Alice and Bob
obtain the state ρ¯AB, which is symmetric by construction. Obviously, for any practical
purpose, applying such a procedure is out of question as it would at least involve a
quantum memory in order to store each subsystem while Alice and Bob wait for the
total state ρAB. One may object, however, that applying such a permutation pi to ρAB
is equivalent to merely relabeling the indices of Alice and Bob’s data, which is much
simpler to implement. The key is that both procedures are indistinguishable, which is
a clear consequence of the fact that the permutation of subsystems commutes with the
measurement procedure and classical post-processing. This is true for most protocols,
such as BB84 or continuous-variable protocols, but not for DPS or COW. In order for
the two procedures to be completely equivalent, Alice and Bob should completely forget
which particular permutation was performed. A second crucial point is that, in reality,
Alice and Bob do not even need to permute the labels of their data. What is really
necessary is that they should never use any information related to the order of their
data (the labeling of their data) when they extract the key.
It must be realized that enforcing such a symmetry can only decrease the secret
key rate since Alice and Bob give additional information to Eve, or, equivalently, forget
some a priori available information. On the other hand, while they are only throwing
information that they do not know use in practice (the labeling of their data), the impact
of this symmetrization step to the key rate is actually negligible. Note than nothing
forbids one to use such a technique in the study of the DPS and COW protocols.
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However, correlations between different subsystems are essential for these protocols to
work and no key could be extracted if one was forgetting them. In principle, any
symmetrization is applicable to any QKD protocol, but some symmetrization procedures
essentially erase all the relevant information and are consequently useless for the study of
such protocols. Other symmetries have been investigated in the literature, for instance
random bit-flip or phase-flip applied simultaneously by Alice and Bob, and have led to
simplifications in the analysis of some protocols [16].
The above reasoning can easily be generalized to other symmetries. Let G be a
symmetry group in H⊗n. Alice and Bob can perform a random g drawn from G and
later forget about g, thus transforming ρAB into
ρ¯GAB = trC
(
1
#G
∑
g∈G
g ρAB g
† ⊗ |g〉〈g|C
)
where #G is the cardinal of G. The group G can even be continuous, in which case the
discrete sum should simply be replaced by an integral over the Haar distribution of G.
This is actually what we will do for continuous-variable protocols.
3. Phase-space symmetry for continuous-variable QKD
3.1. Brief summary of the theoretical analysis of continuous-variable QKD
We rapidly describe continuous-variable protocols, as a more detailed presentation can
be found in [5]. Continuous-variable QKD comes with two flavours depending on
whether the quantum state shared by Alice and Bob is characterized by a quantum bit
error rate (QBER) or by a covariance matrix. In the first category lie protocols where
the quadratures of the light field are just the support for encoding bits. Such protocols
usually use postselection to improve their QBER [17]. Then, the analysis is somewhat
similar to that of discrete-variable protocols. In the second category of protocols such
as [18], with which we are only concerned here, the quantum state shared by Alice and
Bob is characterized by its covariance matrix. This means that the continuous-variable
approach is used even for the description of the state, and not only as a means to carry
information over quantum channels. This approach has an important drawback, namely
that postselection is a priori impossible: one must keep all data. This is particularly
damaging during the classical post-processing of the protocol where one now has to deal
with real random variables instead of binary random variables. The main implication
is that the reconciliation step, which roughly corresponds to correcting discrepancies
between Alice and Bob’s classical data, becomes a task that is much more involved
than correcting errors between two binary strings. The error rate may indeed be much
higher as the protocols with continuous variables may tolerate very low signal-to-noise
ratio. The classical problem of reconciliation was until recently limiting the range of
continuous-variable QKD protocols [19]. However, simpler discrete modulation schemes
can help dealing with the reconciliation problem [10].
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3.2. Rotation symmetries for continuous-variable QKD
One of the nice features of continuous-variable QKD is that the security against collective
attacks is entirely characterized by the covariance matrice of ρAB. As we restrict our
analysis to collective attacks, one has ρAB = σ
⊗n
AB, and the covariance matrix Γ of σAB
is usually assumed to be of the form:
Γsym =
(
X12 Zσz
Zσz Y 12
)
, (1)
where σz = diag(1,−1). Note that this form can easily be understood from an
experimental point of view since the quantum channel is not supposed to induce
correlations between different quadratures, for instance, but no theoretical justification
has been given so far. Here, we use the ideas explained in previous section to prove that
Γ can indeed be supposed to take this simple form.
Since we make the assumption of a collective attack, the covariance matrix Γ is well
defined and can be estimated by Alice and Bob. The most general form for Γ is:
Γ =


X11 X12 Z11 Z12
X12 X22 Z21 Z22
Z11 Z21 Y11 Y12
Z12 Z22 Y12 Y22

 . (2)
The idea is that Alice and Bob can perform some symmetrization operation, which
transforms Γ into Γsym. First, note that their classical data are two strings x, y ∈ Rn,
which correspond to the results of homodyne measurements of the various quadratures
of ρAB. The reconciliation is always optimized for a Gaussian channel, meaning that
the random variable y is modelled as y = tx + z [19] where t is a transmission factor
and z is a random variable modelling the added noise and characterized by its variance
σ2. Therefore, the reconciliation procedure would not be affected if Alice and Bob both
performed the same random orthogonal transformation R ∈ O(n) to their respective
data, since one would then have Ry = tRx+z′, where z′ is a rotated noise with the same
variance σ2. If Alice and Bob apply such a random orthogonal transformation (rotation)
and forget which one has been performed, their data become “symmetric” in the sense
that the matrix Γ takes the form of Γsym where X = (X11 +X22)/2, Y = (Y11 + Y22)/2
and Z = (Z11 − Z22)/2. The fact that the covariance matrix Γsym features Zσz instead
of Z12 simply reflects the fact that Γsym is not the covariance matrix of the classical
data of Alice and Bob in the prepare-and-measure scenario, but the covariance matrix
of ρAB in the equivalent entanglement-based scenario. In the latter case, Alice and Bob
would actually apply conjugate orthogonal transformations to their respective share of
the state instead of the same transformation. By conjugate transformation, we mean the
transformation whose corresponding 2n×2n matrix in phase space is obtained from the
original one by flipping the sign of all rows whose label corresponds to a p quadrature
and then flipping the sign of all columns whose label corresponds to a p quadrature.
This can be understood by considering a two-mode squeezed vacuum, which is the
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state characterizing the inherent symmetry of continuous-variable QKD: this state has
a covariance matrix Γsym where Y = X and Z =
√
X2 − 1, and is invariant under
conjugate orthogonal transformations performed by Alice and Bob.
As we will see, this new symmetrization (based on orthogonal transformations in
phase space instead of permutations in state space) has several crucial consequences.
First, it allows us to rigorously prove that Alice and Bob can safely assume their
covariance matrix to have a simple structure, characterized by only three parameters
which are easily estimated experimentally (this was done until now with no firm
theoretical justification). The second consequence, which we will study in the next
Section, is that it gives a simple structure to the state ρAB which enables us to investigate
the unconditional security using a de Finetti approach.
4. Invariant states under rotations in phase space
The goal of this Section is to give some insights on the structure of the states which
are invariant under orthogonal transformations in phase space. More precisely, if Alice
and Bob perform n homodyne measurements on ρAB (Alice and Bob are assumed to
measure the same quadrature since they discard the data corresponding to measurements
of incompatible quadratures), they obtain two random vectors x, y ∈ Rn. We are
interested in unitary transformations whose effect on ρAB is described by an orthogonal
transformation on the probability distributions of x and y. As these probability
distributions are completely characterized by the Wigner function of ρAB, the states
of interest are simply those whose Wigner function is invariant under such symplectic
transformations.
Before describing the bipartite case, it is useful to consider first the single-party
case, where the state of Bob is traced out.
4.1. Single party case
Here, we are interested in generalizing the concept of orthogonally invariant probability
distributions to the quantum setting, that is, to Wigner functions. A n-mode state ρ
is termed orthogonally invariant in phase space if it is invariant under the action of
any n-mode Gaussian unitary operator corresponding to a real symplectic orthogonal
transformation (or, simply said, a rotation) in the 2n-dimensional phase space of ρ.
Physically, this means that ρ remains unchanged after being processed via any n-mode
passive linear interferometer. The set of such orthogonally invariant states is convex
and is therefore characterized by its extremal points, namely the states
σ
(n)
k =
1
ank
∑
k1···kn
s.t.
P
i
ki=k
|k1 · · ·kn〉〈k1 · · · kn|
where |k1 · · · kn〉 is the n-mode Fock state with ki photons in mode i and ank =
(
n+k−1
n−1
)
.
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Physically, these extremal states are (proportional to) the projectors onto the
different eigenspaces of the total number operator nˆ = nˆ1 + · · · nˆn labelled with the
integer parameter k, corresponding to the total number of photons distributed over the n
modes. The normalization constant ank simply counts the number of ways of distributing
k photons into n modes. These extremal states σ
(n)
k form a discrete infinite set of mixed
states. Importantly, any pure eigenstate chosen in the eigenspace corresponding to a
given total photon number k is generally not orthogonally invariant; only the uniform
mixture of them fulfills this invariance (Schur’s lemma), which is why the extremal
states σ
(n)
k are mixed for n > 1. Finally, any state ρ that is invariant under orthogonal
transformations in phase space can be written as
ρ =
∞∑
k=0
ckσ
(n)
k
where the weights ck satisfy 0 ≤ ck ≤ 1 and
∑
k ck = 1.
4.2. A Gaussian quantum de Finetti theorem for rotation-invariant states
Let us now introduce a classical de Finetti theorem for continuous variables. An infinite
sequence of real-valued random variables X1, · · · , Xn · · · is called orthogonally invariant
if, for every n, the probability distribution ofX1, · · · , Xn is invariant under all orthogonal
transformations of Rn. It was proven in [20, 21] that orthogonally invariant distributions
are exactly mixtures of i.i.d. normal distributions.
This result holds only approximately for finite sequences: if X1, · · · , Xn is invariant
under orthogonal transformations of Rn, then there exists a mixture of i.i.d. normals
such that its variation distance to the marginal law of the first k coordinates of
X1, · · · , Xn is bounded by O(k/n) for k ≪ n [22]. This cannot be directly applied
to quantum systems, however, since Wigner functions are not necessary legitimate
probability distributions (they can be negative). Here, we prove that this generalization
is nevertheless correct in the asymptotic regime. In particular, we prove that an
orthogonally invariant state tends to a mixture of multimode thermal states, which
are products of n thermal states with the same mean photon number.
Let us consider an n-mode state ρ which is orthogonally invariant in phase space.
For any N > n, ρ is the partial trace over (N − n) modes of an N -mode orthogonally
invariant state ρ(N). As stated above, ρ(N) is a convex mixture of the states σNk .
Therefore, it is enough to prove that the trace over (N − n) modes of σNk becomes
asymptotically close (for the trace distance) of a multimode thermal state as N tends
to infinity. Since the state of interest trN−n σ
N
k as well as the “target” n-mode thermal
state ρnth(x) with k/n photons per mode are orthogonally invariant, they can both be
written as mixtures of σnl ’s,
trN−n σ
N
k =
p∑
l=0
f(l)σnl ρ
n
th =
∞∑
l=0
g(l)σnl
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with
f(l) =
anl a
N−n
k−l
aNk
g(l) = anl
(k/N)l
(1 + (k/N))n+l
.
Note that f and g also depend on k, n, and N , but we do not mention these parameters
explicitly in order to simplify the notations. The trace distance between the two states
is given by the variation distance between the two classical probability distributions f
and g
|| trN−n σNk − ρnth||1 =
∞∑
l=0
|f(l)− g(l)|.
The second member can be bounded from above as
∞∑
l=0
|f(l)− g(l)| =
∞∑
l=0
∣∣∣∣f(l)g(l) − 1
∣∣∣∣ g(l) = 2
∞∑
l=0
(
f(l)
g(l)
− 1
)+
g(l)
≤ 2
(
sup
l
f(l)
g(l)
− 1
)
where the last inequality follows from the triangle inequality, and (x)+ stands for x if
x ≥ 0 and 0 if x < 0. Let us introduce the notation
h(l) ≡ f(l)
g(l)
=
aN−nk−l
aNk
× (1 + (k/N))
n+l
(k/N)l
.
The rest of the proof consists in approximating sup h in the asymptotic regime. This is
done by using the asymptotic approximation of aynxn with n→∞ resulting from Stirling’s
formula, namely
aynxn ∼
√
1 + y/x
nx
2y nG(x/y)
where G(z) = (z + 1) log2(z + 1) − z log2(z) is the von Neumann entropy of a thermal
state with z photons. Let us introduce the reduced variables x = k/N , y = n/N ,
z = l/N and t = (1− y)/(x− z). We can approximate the function of interest h(l) as
h(zN) =
a
Nt(x−z)
N(x−z)
aNxN
(1 + x)N(y+z)
xNz
∼ A2NB,
where
A =
√
x(1 + t)
(x− z)(1 + 1/x) =
√
tx(1 + t)
(1− y)(1 + 1/x)
and
B = (1− y)g(1/t)− g(x) + (y + z) log(1 + x)− z log(x).
Deriving B with respect to z, one has
∂B
∂z
= − log(1 + t) + log(1 + 1/x).
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Therefore, B is extremal for t = 1/x, that is z = xy, giving B ≤ 0. As a result, one has
sup
l
h(l) = sup
z
h(zN) ∼ 1√
1− y ∼ 1 +
n
2N
for n≪ N.
Hence, || trN−n σNk − ρnth||1 → 0 for N → ∞, which proves the quantum continuous-
variable version of the de Finetti theorem for orthogonally invariant states in the
asymptotic regime.
4.3. Bipartite case
So far, we only discussed single-partite orthogonally-invariant states. Obviously, in order
to use this approach to the study of QKD security, one needs a bipartite generalization.
Let us consider the case of a 2n-mode bipartite state ρAB, meaning that Alice and Bob
each have n modes. Such a state ρAB is termed invariant under conjugate orthogonal
transformations in phase space if, for any Gaussian unitary operation U corresponding
to a real symplectic orthogonal transformation in Alice’s 2n-dimensional phase space,
it satisfies
U ⊗ U∗ ρAB U † ⊗ UT = ρAB
where U∗ is the Gaussian unitary operation corresponding to the conjugate orthogonal
transformation in Bob’s phase space. Physically, this invariance means that ρAB remains
unchanged when Alice processes her nmodes into any passive linear interferometer while
Bob processes his n modes into the passive linear interferometer effecting the conjugate
rotation in phase space.
Ideally, one should have a quantum de Finetti theorem for bipartite orthogonally
invariant states since this is the case which is directly relevant for proving the security
of continuous-variable QKD. The reason is that, following the arguments in Section
2, Alice and Bob can indeed assume their bipartite state ρAB to be invariant under
conjugate orthogonal transformations. Thus, a bipartite quantum de Finetti theorem
would rigorously prove that ρAB is “close to” a product of Gaussian states. Note,
however, that an exponential version of the theorem would actually be required to
address the security of continuous-variable QKD, meaning that it is enough to trace
over only an exponentially small number of modes in order to get a good approximation
by a Gaussian state. Then, such a Gaussian state would actually be the product of n
i.i.d. Gaussian states, and the security against collective attacks would therefore imply
the security against arbitrary attacks.
Finding a bipartite version of this quantum de Finetti theorem is the subject
of further work. Although we do not have a rigorous proof yet, the fact that a
bipartite version of the theorem holds is very likely. In particular, both partial traces
ρA = trB ρAB and ρB = trA ρAB are single-partite orthogonally-invariant states,
for which the theorem applies. Hence, locally, we already know that a state ρAB
that is invariant under conjugate orthogonal transformations in phase space becomes
asymptotically Gaussian. One only needs to prove that the correlations between Alice
and Bob also behave according to the bipartite version of the theorem.
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5. Conclusion and perspectives
We have discussed the role of symmetries in the security analysis of QKD, and
introduced a new symmetry that is especially suited to continuous-variables schemes.
This symmetry, which can be spelled out in the phase space representation, encompasses
the usual symmetry under permutations in state space that have been considered so
far in the context of discrete-variable QKD. We then derived an asymptotic quantum
de Finetti theorem for orthogonally-invariant states in phase space, and showed that
Gaussian states play a role similar to that of i.i.d. states in the usual de Finetti theorem.
More precisely, any orthogonally-invariant state can be shown to be asymptotically close
to a mixture of product Gaussian (thermal) states. This first application of a symmetry
in phase space to the QKD security analysis seems very promising as Gaussian states
have been known to play a fundamental role in the analysis of continuous-variable QKD.
The perspectives of this work towards proving the unconditional security of
continuous-variable QKD are twofold. A first approach would be to study the
generalization of our (asymptotic) continuous-variable quantum de Finetti theorem
in phase space to the bipartite scenario, and then investigate whether an exponential
version can be derived. The second option would be to see if the techniques recently
introduced in [4] can be generalized to continuous variables.
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